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of the independent action of the Corps in awarding a construction permit
which was not fairly traceable to any of the defendants in this action, the
City, the Commonwealth, or the Board.
Without ruling on whether the land in question was subject to the
Treaty at Middle Plantation, the court viewed the issue of violation of the
Treaty with respect to part one of the standing test. There was no actual or
imminent injury to any of the Tribes' alleged property rights because any
harm would be the result of the Corps issuing a construction permit, not
the Board issuing a VMPP.
The court then summarily dismissed the Tribes' Title VI claim as being
without merit. The court pointed out that Title VI has the same standing
requirements and that the Tribe had failed to meet them. The court added
no discussion as to any possible validity to the claim outside of the standing
issue.
Spencer L. Sears
WASHINGTON
Currens v. Sleek, No. 66830-2, 1999 Wash. LEXIS 883 (Wash. Sept. 9,
1999) (holding that the common enemy doctrine shielded a landowner from
liability for surface water flooding only if the landowner exercised due care
in preventing unnecessary injury to neighboring properties).
The Currenses sought review of an unpublished appeals court decision
affirming the summary judgment dismissal of their complaint against Irene
Sleek and Dennis Stephenson Logging ("Logging"). At issue was whether
liability may arise for property damage caused by an increased flow of
surface water onto the Currenses' property after Sleek clear-cut and graded
her land.
The Currenses and Ms. Sleek owned neighboring property in Clark
County. Water from a portion of the Sleek property naturally seeped into a
forested, low-lying sink area on the Currenses' property. In 1993, Sleek
decided to clear-cut her property in order to develop four home sites. As
required by the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, Sleek submitted
an environmental checklist to the Department of Natural Resources, which
provided that Sleek would plant trees to enhance vegetation on the property
and would install dry wells to mitigate storm water impacts. Utilizing
Logging, Sleek clear-cut and graded her property in 1994; however, she
took no action to revegetate the land or to reduce the flow of surface water
over the sites. Sleek also never installed the required dry wells. The
following year, the natural sink area in the Currenses' property flooded
causing eleven trees to fall, and the Currenses removed an additional
twenty trees in order to ensure the safety of their home.
The common enemy doctrine governed the issues on appeal, because it
had directed the law of surface water in Washington since 1896. In its
strictest form, the common enemy doctrine allowed landowners to dispose
of unwanted surface water in any way they see fit, without liability for
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resulting damage to one's neighbor. Because a strict application of the rule
was widely regarded as inequitable, this court adopted several exceptions
to the common enemy doctrine over the years.
The first exception provided that although landowners may block the
flow of diffuse surface water onto their land, they may not inhibit the flow
of a watercourse or natural drainway. A natural drainway must be kept
open to carry water into streams and lakes, and a lower proprietor cannot
obstruct surface water when it runs in a natural drainage channel or
depression.
Another exception prevented landowners from collecting water and
channeling it onto their neighbors' land. This rule prohibited a landowner
from creating an unnatural conduit, but allowed him or her to direct diffuse
surface waters into pre-existing natural waterways and drainways. Thus,
the court stated the common enemy doctrine in Washington allows
landowners to alter the flow of surface water to the detriment of their
neighbors, so long as they do not block a watercourse or natural drainway,
nor collect and discharge water onto their neighbors' land in quantities
greater than, or in a manner different from, its natural flow.
The main concern on appeal was whether Washington courts should
consider the reasonableness of a landowner's actions in determining
liability for damaged caused by excess surface water. Sleek and Logging
argued that the common enemy doctrine in Washington did not permit a
court to consider the reasonableness of a landowner's actions in
determining liability. The Currenses asserted that Washington already
recognized that the common enemy doctrine shielded only reasonable
conduct; thus, a landowner that acts unreasonably may be liable for
damages caused by surface water flooding.
The court found that although Washington had not explicitly adopted a
due care exception to its common enemy doctrine, language in past cases
indicated that landowner negligence was a relevant factor in the decisionmaking process. The court held that under Washington's common enemy
jurisprudence, landowners who altered the flow of surface water on their
property must have exercised their rights with due care by acting in good
faith and by avoiding unnecessary damage to the property of others.
The Washington Environmental Council submitted an amicus brief and
urged the court to reject the common enemy jurisprudence entirely and
adopt the reasonable use rule instead. The critical difference between the
two approaches was that the common enemy doctrine did not require any
inquiry into the utility of the particular project. When determining liability
under the common enemy doctrine, the due care exception required the
court to look only to whether the landowner exercised due care in
improving his or her land. Unlike the reasonable use rule, a landowner's
duty under the common enemy doctrine was not determined by weighing
the nature and importance of the improvements against the damage caused
to one's neighbor. Rather, a landowner has an unqualified right to embark
on any improvements of the land allowed by law, but must limit the harm
caused by changes in the flow of surface Water to those that are reasonably
necessary. Since adopting a rule that required parties to litigate the
importance of a particular project in order to apportion liability was
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inconsistent with the state's historic deference to property rights, the court
declined to abandon its common enemy jurisprudence in favor of the
reasonable use rule.
The court reversed the summary judgment ruling and remanded to
determine whether the third, due care, exception applied allowing the
Currenses to bring suit.
Melody Divine
Halverson v. Skagit County, 983 P.2d 643 (Wash. 1999) (holding that
the flood damage to landowner's properties did not support an inverse
condemnation claim against Skagit County because it did not actually or
proximately cause the levees to come into existence and the common
enemy doctrine protected Skagit County from liability).
The Skagit River delta floodplain was located in Skagit County,
Washington just before the Skagit River empties into the Skagit Bay on the
Puget Sound. The floodplain was approximately eleven miles by nineteen
miles and covers about 90,000 acres of property. The Nookachamps area
was located upstream from Mt. Vernon, Washington and across the river
from Burlington, Washington. This area has historically been subject to
flooding. In fact, there are records of numerous severe floods during the
1800s and the Skagit River reached flood stage an average of once every
2.2 years between 1900 and 1991. Beginning in 1863, landowners built
dikes to combat the flooding. The legislature passed legislation allowing
the creation and organization of public diking districts in 1895. The
legislature made these diking districts independent of the government and
they have the power of eminent domain, the power to assess taxes, and the
power to issue bonds. Sixteen diking districts currently exist and they
maintain about fifty-six miles of levees and thirty-nine miles of sea dikes in
the delta.
Severe flooding occurred twice in November 1990 and the Halversons
and the other property owners in the Nookachamps area (together
"Halversons") sued both Skagit County ("County") and the two diking
districts they felt were at fault for the flooding. The diking districts were
voluntarily dismissed; however, the Halversons pursued the suit against the
County. The Halversons alleged that the County acted in concert with the
diking districts in the maintenance, improvement, and operation of the
diking system, and thus it's actions caused an increase in the amount of
flooding on the land. They further allege that this increased flooding
constituted an inverse condemnation under the Washington State
Constitution. The County also brought a contribution and indemnity claim
against the State of Washington ("State").
In the lower court the Halversons argued that the levees flooded their
property more severely than it would have been had there been no levees
along the river. The County countered that it was not liable for the
construction and operation of the levees because the independent diking
districts owned them. The County continued stating that if it was

